We look at a dynamic contest model with synergy, where winning the …rst contest yields an advantage in the second contest. The win advantage introduces an asymmetry into the competition that we …nd reduces the expected value to the contestants of being in the game, whilst it increases the e¤orts exerted. Hence, a win advantage is advantageous for an e¤ort-maximizing contest designer, whereas in expectation it is not bene…cial for the players. We also show that the principal should distribute all the prize mass to the second contest. Furthermore, we show that players' e¤orts increase over time provided that the second-contest prize is su¢ ciently high. Both these results hold for more than two players. The basic conclusion that prize mass should come late is robust to heterogeneity in the win advantages, and in most cases if players …ght to avoid a disadvantage from losing. If the principal maximizes a weighted sum of e¤orts and contestants'payo¤s, the main result holds unless the importance of the payo¤ component is very large.
Introduction
Many contest situations have the features that (i) contestants meet more than once, (ii) winning in early rounds gives an advantage in later rounds, and (iii) the prize structure is such that the prize value in each stage di¤ers. In this paper, we set up a model to study such a contest situation. In this model, there are two contests run in sequence among the same set of players, and the winner of the …rst contest has a lower cost of e¤ort than the other player(s) in the second one.
The win advantage from the early round introduces an asymmetry into the subsequent competition. We …nd that this reduces the expected value to the contestants of being in the game, whilst it increases the e¤orts exerted. Hence, a win advantage is advantageous for an e¤ort-maximizing contest designer, whereas, in expectation, it will not be bene…cial for the players. We also show that, if possible, the principal should distribute all of the prize mass to the second contest in order to maximize total e¤ort across the two contests. This result is robust when expanding the model to more competitors.
In the presence of a win advantage, losing the …rst-round contest may have one of two potential e¤ects on a player before the second round: he may be discouraged by his earlier loss and the entailing disadvantage in e¤ort costs and thus reduce his e¤ort before the second contest relative to a case of no win advantage; or he may be encouraged to increase his e¤ort in order to compensate for this disadvantage in the …ght for the second-round prize. In our analysis, we …nd that the former e¤ect dominates, so that the win advantage discourages the early loser.
Our results indicate how a principal can a¤ect the stream of contest e¤orts over time by dividing the prize mass between contests. In some applications, a principal may desire to have most e¤ort early on; the stage contest that we use has been used to model innovation games, 1 and here one might wish to give research teams an incentive to early e¤ort in order to bring forward the discovery time of a new product. Once the product or prototype is discovered, the teams can then re…ne their ideas, with the winner having an extra advantage at the re…nement stage. In other applications, the principal may wish competitors to have most e¤ort later on in order to allow the players to exploit the enhanced e¢ ciency from the win advantage. An example here could be a research council that announces competitions for pilot projects before full-scale research projects are considered. 2 There are numerous other real-life situations, in areas such as business, politics, and sport, that have features resembling our set-up. Sequences of contests are also in frequent use in sales-force management, with seller-of-the-month awards and the like in order to provide motivation for the sales force. In such sales forces, it is not uncommon for the more successful agents to be given less administrative duties, better access to back-o¢ ce resources, more training than the less successful, and better territories; see, e.g., Skiera and Albers (1998) , Farrell and Hakstian (2001) , 1 See, e.g., Baye and Hoppe (2003) and Fullerton and McAfee (1999) . 2 Gallini and Scotchmer (2002, p. 54) suggest that competing for grants is easier for those who have won previously: " [F] uture grants are contingent upon previous success. The linkage between previous success and future funding seems even more speci…c in the case of the National Science Council". and Krishnamoorthy, et al. (2005) . These factors may reduce the successful salesperson's cost of e¤ort. In many organizations, promotion games may have the same multi-stage structure, and in a number of sports, teams meet repeatedly throughout the season. The winner of a pre-election TV debate may be seen as obtaining a win advantage in the ensuing election (Schrott, 1990) . In a quite di¤erent setting, students are subject to a number of tests throughout the year, with the …nal ranking being based on an exam in the end.
A further source of win advantage may be psychological (Krumer, 2013) . Evidence pointing to the presence of a win advantage in sequential competition is found in experimental studies carried out by Reeve, et al. (1985) and Vansteenkiste and Deci (2003) . These studies show that winners feel more competent than losers, and that winning facilitates competitive performance and contributes positively to an individual's intrinsic motivation.
The study closest to ours is that of Möller (2012) . Like us, he posits a sequence of contests in which the principal can choose how to distribute the prize fund across the contests. His win advantage di¤ers from ours, though, since his contest designer can use prizes to …ne-tune the amount of heterogeneity between competitors in the second contest. He posits a smooth relationship between the …rst-contest prize and the ability to compete in the second period, so that a designer can choose exactly which types of player compete in the second contest. Such power is often out of the scope of a contest designer or principal. Our model captures a situation where there is a discrete advantage from winning, and where a loser gains nothing. Moreover, the size of the win advantage in our model is not related to the size of the prize on o¤er in the …rst contest; a psychological advantage of beating an opponent is, for example, not necessarily related to the immediate prize. Hence, the principal cannot …ne-tune the opponents that meet in the second contest. Our work is easily extended to many players, but contest design in Möller (2012) would be di¢ cult in this case.
The win advantage in the work of Megidish and Sela (2014) is, on the other hand, more similar to ours. The winner of the …rst contest in a sequence of two competes for a di¤erent prize in the second contest, whilst the prize of the loser is the same in both rounds. The advantage to winning is thus that a higher prize is available, whereas in our model, e¤ort cost is lower.
3 Their focus is on the e¤ect of budget constraints on the temporal decisions of the contestants, whereas we look at this more from a contest-design perspective, discussing how to divide the prize mass over the two contests.
Also related is the study of Beviá and Corchón (2013) , who look at the evolvement of strength in two sequential contests with identical prizes. The initial Tullock probability function (interpreted here as a share) is augmented with a weight for each of two players showing ex-ante strength. The share of the prize gained by a player in the …rst contest translates into a strength in the second one by an increasing transition function. Since e¤ort in ‡uences the share of the prize in a continuous way, and the share then increases the strength continuously, the Beviá-Corchón paper is more similar to Clark and Nilssen (2013) , who consider a direct correspondence between current e¤ort and the e¤ort cost in a subsequent contest. Schmitt, et al. (2004) , Casas-Arce and Martínez-Jerez (2009), and Grossmann and Dietl (2009) also discuss such dynamic e¤ort e¤ects, whereby early e¤orts create later advantages. In Kovenock and Roberson (2009) , it is the net e¤ort, i.e., a winner's e¤ort over and above that of the other player's e¤ort, that creates an advantage in a later contest. Yildirim (2005) looks at a single contest in which efforts can be made over two rounds before the winner is decided; …rst-round e¤orts are observed before second-round e¤orts are made.
More generally, our work is related to studies of dynamic battles; see the survey by Konrad (2009, ch 8) . One such battle is the race, in which there is a grand prize to the player who …rst scores a su¢ cient number of wins. A related notion is the tug-of-war, where the winner of the grand prize is the one who …rst gets a su¢ ciently high lead. Early formal analyses of the race and the tug-of-war were done by Harris and Vickers (1987) . A study of a race where there, as in our model, also are intermediate prizes in each round, in addition to the grand prize of the race, is Konrad and Kovenock (2009) .
Another variation of a dynamic battle is the elimination tournament, where the best players in an early round are the only players proceeding to the next round (Rosen, 1986) . Thus, in an elimination tournament, the number of players decreases over time. Although this is a di¤erent setting to ours, the same types of issue are investigated. Fu and Lu (2012) …nd, in line with our result, that it is optimal for the contest designer to put the whole prize mass in the …nal round. Delfgaauw, et al. (2015) correspondingly …nd, in a …eld experiment, that increasing late prizes leads to higher total e¤ort. Mago, et al. (2013) …nd that intermediate prizes increase e¤orts of both winner and loser in their theoretical and experimental analyses. This is contrary to our …nding that it is optimal to shift prizes to the …nal round. However, in their work there is no win advantage. Krumer (2013) and Clark and Nilssen (2017) carry out analyses related to ours, where each stage contains an all-pay auction with a win advantage, whereas the present analysis is based on a Tullock contest at each stage. Klein and Schmutzler (2017) analyze a series of contests in which the e¤ort in each period may be weighted when deciding on the …nal prize. They show, in line with our results, that the bulk of the prize mass should be distributed to the …nal round.
Still another variation of a dynamic battle with some kind of advantage to winning early is the incumbency contest. Here, the winner of one round of the contest is the "king of the hill"in the next round and thus has an advantage that resembles our win advantage; see the analyses by Ofek and Sarvary (2003) and Moene (2006, 2008) .
Our analysis concerns a setting where the win advantage is exogenous while the prize distribution across contests is decided by the principal. Still, there is a clear link to the analyses of Meyer (1992) , Ridlon and Shin (2013) , and Franke, et al. (2013) , who discuss situations where the win advantage, and therefore the asymmetry between players in the second contest, is decided upon by a contest designer. Similarly, Esteve-González (2016) shows, in a setting with repeated services procurement, that mitigation of a moral hazard problem in service provision may be achieved through introducing a bias in the second period contest based on past performance.
As discussed above, several papers examine -in di¤erent settings -the need to distribute prize mass later in a series of contests in order to maximize e¤ort, and our main …ndings corroborate this. However, we identify an interesting asymmetry between the case where contestants compete in the …rst contest in order to gain e¢ ciency in the second contest, and the case in which players compete to avoid becoming less e¢ cient in the next contest. We call this a case of "loss disadvantage". When both e¤ects are present, an e¤ort-maximizing principal should indeed place all prize mass in the second contest. In contrast, however, when there is only a loss disadvantage, total e¤ort is independent of the division of the prize between contests.
When introducing a synergy between contests, many model architectures are possible. We model the win advantage as a¤ecting costs in line with Krumer (2013) . As noted above, Beviá and Corchón (2013) allow players' strength to evolve according to prior outcomes. Clark and Nilssen (2018a) look at the relationship between a win advantage that a¤ects costs, and one that a¤ects the contest success function directly, pointing out under which conditions these may be regarded as equivalent. Most of our analysis involves a symmetric win advantage, i.e., the advantage achieved is independent of the identity of the winner. We show below that a principal would still prefer to award the prize mass late even if the win advantages were di¤erent for the players.
4 A principal with a preference for maximizing a weighted sum of players' pro…t and e¤orts is also considered.
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Since the introduction of a win advantage is detrimental to the pro…ts of the contestants, we …nd that it is optimal to run a single contest if the weight on pro…t is su¢ ciently high. However, it is optimal to leave the prize mass to the second contest for a wide combination of the parameters in the model, in line with our original result.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present the basic model, and section 3 analyzes the optimal prize structure. In section 4, we extend the analysis to contests with more than two players. In section 5, we consider three di¤erent speci…cations of the model: (i) a loss disadvantage in addition to the win advantage; (ii) asymmetric win advantages; and (iii) maximization of a weighted sum of pro…ts and e¤orts. Finally, in section 6, we present some concluding remarks.
The model
Consider two identical players, 1 and 2, who compete with each other in two interlinked sequential contests. The players compete by making non-refundable outlays and determine their e¤orts in each contest as part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which each player's aim is to maximize own expected payo¤. In each contest, the winner is determined by a generalized Tullock contest success function: 6 p(x 1;t ; x 2;t ) = x r 1;t
where x i;t is the e¤ort exerted by player i 2 f1; 2g in contest t 2 f1; 2g. p(x 1;t ; x 2;t ) is the probability that player 1 wins the prize in contest t, making 1 p(x 1;t ; x 2;t ) the probability that player 2 wins it. The parameter r > 0 represents the elasticity of the odds of winning. When r 2 (0; 1), there are decreasing returns to e¤ort in each contest, and when r > 1, there are increasing returns to e¤ort. The linkage between the two contests occurs via a win advantage that reduces the marginal cost of e¤ort of the …rst-contest winner in the second contest to a 2 (0; 1]; the smaller is a, the larger is the win advantage. The loser of the …rst contest continues to the second contest with a marginal cost of e¤ort of 1.
In order to ensure a pure-strategy equilibrium in the second contest, we make the assumption 7 r a r < 1: (2) Without any win advantage, so that a = 1, this condition amounts to r < 2. But the larger is the win advantage, i.e., the lower is a, the stricter the condition becomes. Still, for non-increasing returns to e¤orts, r 1, a pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the second contest for any a 2 (0; 1].
The total prize over the two contests is 1, with (1 M ) being the prize in the …rst contest and M the prize in the second, where M 2 [0; 1]; thus, the contest prize increases over time if and only if M 
Analysis
The model is solved by backward induction starting with contest 2. Denote by x 1;2 (i) and x 2;2 (i) the e¤orts of players 1 and 2 in the second contest given that player i has won the …rst. The expected payo¤s in contest 2 are
M x j;2 (i); i; j = 1; 2; j 6 = i:
6 As axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) and used in numerous contest applications; see, for example, Konrad (2009) .
7 It follows from Nti (1999, Proposition 3 ) that this condition ensures the existence of a purestrategy equilibrium. Nti considers a contest in which players have the same marginal cost of e¤ort and di¤erent prize valuations. Our framework can be transformed to his with secondcontest prize values
An interior second-contest equilibrium is found by solving
(1 + a r ) 2 M , and (3)
Hence, the winner of the …rst contest becomes more e¢ cient at exerting e¤ort in the second contest and exerts more e¤ort than the rival: x i;2 (i) x j;2 (i). This leads to a larger than one-half chance of winning the second contest -1 1+a
, to be precise -and the more e¢ cient player also has a larger expected payo¤:
At the beginning of the …rst contest, player i has an expected payo¤ of
The expected payo¤ from the …rst contest consists of three elements: (i) the probability that a player wins the …rst contest multiplied by the prize for the …rst contest plus the expected pro…t from the second contest having won the …rst; (ii) the probability of losing the …rst contest multiplied by the expected payo¤ from the second contest having lost the …rst; and (iii) the …rst-period cost of e¤ort. Seen from the …rst period, the players solve identical maximization problems. Writing out the expected payo¤ for player i in full, using (1) through (6) and recalling that the prizes in the two contests are (1 M ) and M , respectively, gives
Here, the …rst term is a constant. Therefore, a player's …rst-order condition in the …rst contest is
8 See, e.g., equations (7) and (9) in Nti (1999) . 9 Note that i;2 (i)
At an interior symmetric equilibrium, we have x 1;1 = x 2;1 , giving rise to the …rst-contest equilibrium e¤ort
Denote total e¤orts in the two contests by X 1 = x 1;1 + x 2;1 and X 2 = x i;2 (i) + x j;2 (i), respectively, with total e¤ort over both contests given by X = X 1 + X 2 . Using (9) in (8), and adding (3) and (4), we …nd the following.
Proposition 1 In an equilibrium with prizes in the two contests equal to (1 M ) and M , respectively, total e¤orts in the contests are
(1 + a r ) 2 M , and (11)
The total expected value of the two-contest game to each player is
An increase in the dynamic win advantage, so that a decreases, would quite intuitively lead to an increase in players' interest in winning the …rst contest, for any M > 0, since the gain from winning that …rst contest would increase; in other words,
0. An increase in M , on the other hand, would imply a decrease in the …rst-contest prize (1 M ) and therefore entail a decrease in the …rst-contest e¤ort:
0. Finally, we note that an increase in the e¢ ciency of e¤ort would lead to higher …rst-contest e¤ort, since a higher r would imply that e¤ort would translate more e¤ectively into a higher chance of getting the win advantage:
In the second contest, an increase in the dynamic win advantage, so that a decreases, quite naturally would lead to a higher e¤ort from the …rst-contest winner and a lower e¤ort from the loser:
0, and
The former e¤ect is the stronger, so that total second-contest e¤ort increases when the dynamic win advantage becomes stronger: dX 2 da 0; the winner increases his e¤ort more than the loser decreases his. Similarly, the e¤ect of an increase in M is an increase in the second-period prize and therefore and increase in players'second-contest e¤orts. Interestingly, the total e¤ect on e¤ort is positive: When M increases, …rst-contest e¤orts decrease by less than second-contest e¤orts increase.
The e¤ect of an increase in the e¢ ciency of e¤ort is slightly more complicated in the second contest than in the …rst one. When the win advantage is large, so that also the di¤erence between players is large, there are cases where higher e¤ort e¢ ciency decreases e¤ort. However, for su¢ ciently low win advantage, meaning a su¢ ciently high, an increase in r increases e¤ort for both the winner and the loser: Part (b) of Proposition 2 is particularly interesting. In many situations, contest designers have a …xed prize budget to distribute across a sequence of contests. Our result shows that, when there is a win advantage present in a sequence of two contests, a contest designer or principal who wants to maximize total e¤orts among participants should place all his prize mass in the second one. This insight has far-reaching consequences for example on how research councils should run their research programs, with small funds awarded in early rounds in order to keep as much funds as possible for the …nal round of a program. 10 We state:
Corollary If a 2 (0; 1), then, in order to maximize total e¤ort, a contest designer should set M = 1.
Part (a) of Proposition 2 says that the win advantage bene…ts the contract designer, and that it would be optimal to have more of it, if possible, in order to increase total e¤orts among participants. This result is closely related to that of Meyer (1992) and others on the bene…t of biased contests.
Whether or not players'e¤orts increase over time depends on how prizes are distributed across the two contests. In particular, from (10) and (11), we have
which implies the following.
Proposition 3 (a) In an equilibrium with prizes in the two contests equal to (1 M ) and M , respectively, players'e¤orts increase over time, i.e., X 1 < X 2 , if and only if the second-contest prize is su¢ ciently high; in particular, if and only if .
10 With discounting between time periods, this e¤ect would be strengthened. In contest 1, discounting future payo¤s would make it less attractive to win the …rst stage and achieve an advantage in the future. Hence e¤ort falls in the …rst contest when payo¤s are discounted. To weigh up for this the e¤ort maximizing designer moves all of the prize mass to the second contest. , and c M decreases in the dynamic win advantage, i.e.,
Part (a) of Proposition 3 is explained by the fact that the …rst-contest total e¤ort is decreasing in M , whereas the second-contest total e¤ort is increasing in M . As for part (b) and the e¤ect of the e¢ ciency of e¤ort, r, we know from Proposition 1 that increasing r implies that the contestants would increase their …rst-contest e¤ort, X 1 , which naturally implies that the critical prize level c M is higher. Furthermore, with increasing returns to e¤ort, an increase in the gain from winning the …rst contest makes the contestants more eager to exert e¤ort in the …rst contest to become the advantaged player in the second contest. In addition, we also know that, for a su¢ ciently high win advantage, a high e¤ort e¢ ciency may decrease e¤ort in the second contest. To counter these e¤ects, an increase in the second contest prize is required for total e¤ort in the second contest to be higher than the total e¤ort in the …rst contest. When considering the case of decreasing returns to e¤ort, an increase in the win advantage a¤ects e¤orts both in the …rst and second contests similarly to the case of increasing returns to e¤ort. However, contrary to the case of increasing returns, the e¤ect of a higher win advantage is to increase the total e¤ort in the second contest more than in the …rst contest. To ensure increasing e¤ort over time, the contest designer needs to rely less on the second contest prize level as a motivation.
Total e¤ort in the comparable case in Megidish and Sela (2014) is always higher in the …rst contest.
11 They consider constant returns to e¤ort (r = 1), so our result tallies with theirs for M < 1 2 . In our model, however, even for this special case of constant returns to e¤ort, it is possible to induce more total e¤ort in the second contest by distributing enough of the prize in that contest.
At the contest designer's optimum M = 1, the loser's e¤ort in the second contest is ra r (1+a r ) 2 , while each contestant's e¤ort in the …rst contest is r 2 1 2 a r 1+a r , according to (4) and (9), respectively. Thus, if a r 2 p 5 2; 1 (0:236; 1], then even the loser increases his e¤ort from contest one to contest two. It is only if the win advantage e¤ect is large -a < p 5 2 1=r -that the loser decreases his e¤ort in contest 2 compared to contest 1 when the contest designer's optimum distribution of the prize mass is instituted. 12 More generally, the winner of the …rst contest will have a higher e¤ort in the second as long as the second period prize is large enough:
It is easily veri…ed that M 2 [0;
]. Hence the winner of the …rst contest does not necessarily need a larger prize in the second contest to exert more e¤ort at 11 Megidish and Sela (2014) , Proposition 4, with r = 1. 12 In light of the condition in (2), we see that, for this to happen, we must have a < p 5 2
this point; he uses the win advantage to exert e¤ort more cheaply than in the …rst contest. In the comparable case in Megidish and Sela (2014) , the …rst contest winner exerts more e¤ort in the second stage as long as the winner's prize in the second contest is su¢ ciently close in value to the …rst contest prize. 13 It can be established that @M @a > 0 when (2) holds, so that a greater win advantage in our model (low a) induces more e¤ort in the second contest by the winner of the …rst for a lower level of prize fund in the second contest. Similarly, the loser of the …rst contest has a larger e¤ort in the second contest if
If a < p 5 2 1=r , then M 0 > 1, so that the loser of the …rst contest must decrease e¤ort in the second contest; the win advantage of the rival is too large, and it is not possible to compensate this with a large enough prize. Otherwise, both players have more e¤ort in the second contest than in the …rst for M > M 0 . Below this level of second contest prize, the loser reduces e¤ort in the second contest compared to the …rst, whereas the winner may increase. Note that the condition for increasing aggregate e¤orts over time, from Proposition 3, is that M > c M , where c M is a weighted average of M and M 0 .
14 Since the loser of the …rst contest has no reduction in his marginal cost of e¤ort, he is only enticed to increase e¤ort in the second contest if there is a su¢ ciently large prize on o¤er.
We now consider how the expected payo¤ of the game is a¤ected by the model parameters. Clearly, (13) indicates that the players'expected payo¤ is decreasing in M , and that the maximum payo¤ is attained from a single contest (M = 0) at 2 r 4
. Expected payo¤ is not monotonic in the win advantage, however, as indicated by Figure 1 .
Only parameter combinations to the left of a = (r 1) 1 r admit the equilibrium, and the area above a = 1 3 1 r sees an increase in a leading to an increase in expected pro…ts for the players; i.e. a lower win advantage increases pro…t here. The parameter a a¤ects behavior through the anticipation of play in the second contest; the di¤erence between (5) and (6) measures what is at stake since this is the di¤erence in payo¤ in contest two for the winner and loser of contest one. It is straightforward to determine that i;2 (i) j;2 (i) is falling and convex in a. There is more at stake when the win advantage is large.
Introducing a win e¤ect in the …rst contest, by reducing a below 1, will initially cause the expected value of the contest to fall for high values of a (i.e., a small win advantage). This value will increase as the win advantage becomes larger (smaller values of a). From (13) it is easy to verify that 1;1 and 2;1 reach a minimum value of Why does the expected value initially decrease and then increase as the win advantage gets larger? The cases a ! 0 and a = 1 both collapse to a single contest; the former since the winner of the …rst contest has almost zero cost of e¤ort in the second contest, making the opponent give up, and the latter since the contests are no longer related, and the prize can be distributed in one go. When a is increased from zero, the winner of the …rst contest has a lower e¤ort level, but at a higher cost. The loser increases e¤ort. Taking into account the probability of winning and losing the …rst contest, and the fact that higher values of a lead the winner to do less but at a higher cost leads to a total expected cost of e¤ort function which is concave in a and given by EC 1 = EC 2 = x 1;1 + p 1;1 x 1;1 ; x 2;1 ax 1;2 (1) + (1 p 1;1 x 1;1 ; x 2;1 )x 1;2 (2)
This expression reaches a maximum at a = 1 3 1=r . 16 As a is initially reduced from 1, the extra e¤ort induced by the …rst-contest winner occurs at quite a high cost. As a falls further, the extra e¤ort costs less and less at the margin, until the cost 16 Correspondingly to the above discussion of the expected value, this holds unless 4 3 < r < 1 + a r , in which case the expected cost is increasing in the win advantage for all feasible values of a and r. e¤ect dominates and more e¤ort actually costs less.
The win advantage introduces an asymmetry into the competition that reduces the expected value to the contestants of being in the game, whilst it increases the e¤orts exerted. Hence it may seem that a win advantage is advantageous for an e¤ort-maximizing contest designer, whereas in expectation it will not be bene…cial for the players. A winning experience might in this sense be thought of as negative, although the player that actually ends up winning the …rst round will have an increase in expected payo¤ in the second contest.
Large contests
In order to discuss the case of n 2 participants, we limit our attention to the case of constant returns to e¤ort; that is, we assume r = 1. Using the n-player constant-returns-to-e¤ort equivalent of (1) -with a prize (1 M ) in the …rst contest, a prize M in second, and player i as the winner of the …rst conteste¤orts in contest 2 for the winner of contest 1 and the (n 1) losers are
; and
with total e¤ort in contest 2 equal to
Expected payo¤s in contest 2 equal
and (15) j;2 (i) = M a n + a 1 2 ; j 6 = i:
For player i, the expected pro…t at contest 1 is
where X i;1 is the total e¤ort in contest 1 of player i's rivals. Maximizing this expression with respect to i's e¤ort, using the continuation payo¤s in (15) and (16), yields a symmetric equilibrium e¤ort in the …rst contest per player of 17
where we have suppressed the player subscript. Total e¤ort in contest 1 is hence X 1 = nx 1 . This leads to e¤orts increasing over time -i.e., X 1 < X 2 -if the second-contest prize M is large enough, in particular if
which is strictly greater than 1 2 for any n 3 and a 2 (0; 1), and approaches
, and a unilaterally increased e¤ort gives a larger chance of beating n 1 rivals. This causes e¤orts to shift to the early contest.
Aggregate e¤orts over both contests are
(1 4a) n 2a ; (18) which is linear in M . It is easily veri…ed that the square-bracketed term in (18) is positive for feasible values of n and a: Hence, total e¤ort increases in M , and the e¤ort-maximizing choice of this variable is M = 1, implying that the contest designer would like to allocate the full prize mass to the second contest also in large games. Inserting equilibrium e¤orts into the payo¤ functions of the players yields the equilibrium expected payo¤ for each player:
This is decreasing in M . Moreover, it is convex in a, reaching a minimum at a = . We also …nd that it quite naturally is decreasing in n: more contestants reduce the expected value of the game for each player.
At the contest designer's optimum M = 1, a loser's e¤ort in the second contest is higher than his e¤ort in the …rst contest if and only if and 1 2 3 p 5 0:38. Hence, a loser will have more e¤ort in the second contest when the win advantage is su¢ ciently small (i.e. a is su¢ ciently high); what constitutes a su¢ ciently high value of a depends upon the number of contestants.
Alternative speci…cations
In this section, we present some alternative speci…cations of the basic model.
Loss disadvantage
In some situations, the implication of a …rst-round contest may just as well be a disadvantage in future contests su¤ered by the loser as an advantage gained by the winner. In order to discuss the notion of a loss disadvantage, we introduce a second-round e¤ort cost bx for the loser of the …rst-round contest, where b 1. The higher b, the larger the e¤ect on a player's future costs from losing today. In addition, we retain the advantage accruing to the winner, so that the second-round e¤ort cost is ax for the …rst period winner, with a 2 (0; 1]. We also set r = 1, and n = 2.
With prizes 1 M in the …rst period and M in the second, players'expected second-period payo¤s are i;2 (i) =
M bx j;2 (i); i; j = 1; 2; j 6 = i:
These give rise to equilibrium second-round e¤orts and payo¤s for the …rst-round winner and loser:
In the …rst contest, each player thus maximizes
This leads to the following equilibrium values in the …rst round:
Total e¤ort is now
Thus, the introduction of a loss disadvantage decreases total e¤ort, for any b > 1, but does not alter the conclusion that the principal should put the prize mass in the second contest. Interestingly, though, we see that, with a pure loss disadvantage -such that b > a = 1 -the contest designer is indi¤erent: in this case, M has no e¤ect on total e¤ort. To look at this e¤ect in more detail, consider the total e¤orts of the winner and the loser of the …rst contest, denoted by X W and X L , which, by (19), (20), and (21), are
An increase in M , moving more of the prize mass to the second contest, reduces the e¤ort of both players symmetrically in the …rst contest. However, such a redistribution of the prize increases the total e¤ort of the …rst-contest winner if b a 2 2 a , which must be the case, since b 1 and a 2 2 a 1 for a 2 (0; 1]. Increasing M raises the total e¤ort of the …rst-contest loser if 2 a > b. When a < 1, total e¤ort increases with an increase in M , by (22) . If the loss disadvantage is su¢ ciently small, i.e., if 2 a > b, then this occurs through both players increasing e¤ort, whereas the reduction in e¤ort by a heavily disadvantaged …rst-contest loser will be outweighed by the increase in e¤ort of the rival. Hence, for a < 1, the e¤ort-maximizing principal will move all prize mass to contest two, setting M = 1.
When b > 1 = a, contestants compete in the …rst contest in order to avoid being the disadvantaged player in contest two; there is no e¢ ciency gain now, just an e¢ ciency loss from losing. There is hence a reduced incentive to move e¤ort to the …rst contest, since the only advantage now is to avoid a cost addition in the next contest (which was also present in the case analyzed above). Redistributing the prize from contest one to contest two causes …rst-period e¤orts to fall but is equalled by the increase in e¤orts in the second period. When a win advantage is present, players have an extra incentive to win the …rst round since they will be able to save e¤ort cost in contest two; when this e¤ect is not present, total e¤ort is independent of the division of the prize.
We could also consider a case in which b > a > 1 so that each player has higher e¤ort cost in the second contest, but the winner of the …rst has a lower increase. This could be consistent with fatigue (see, e.g., Ryvkin, 2011) , so that both players tire before the second competition, but the winner less so. In this case, e¤ort is maximized by setting M = 0, which amounts to running a single, symmetric contest with a prize of 1. Allowing players to compete when they are fatigued is, of course, not good for their total e¤ort.
Asymmetric win advantages
The inherent symmetry in the model allows for a convenient analytical representation of the results in the previous sections since actions in the …rst contest are identical across players. In the case of loss disadvantage, the players get di¤erent cost parameters in the second contest, but each of them has the same chance to be the winner or loser of the …rst. Introducing asymmetry greatly complicates the analysis in these Tullock contests with synergy. Suppose that the contestants' win advantages are not necessarily the same, so that one player gains a larger cost advantage than the other following a win in the …rst contest.
18 Let the win advantage be a 1 6 = a 2 as the second contest costs for the players. This changes the strategic setting, since the lower cost player will have the most to gain from winning contest one.
Using results from previous sections, it is straightforward to show that secondcontest e¤orts and payo¤s are
With the help of equations (25) and (26), the expected pro…t for player i = 1; 2, seen from contest one, can be written as:
where
Maximizing the expected payo¤s of each player by choice of x i;1 gives the following equilibrium values for contest one:
Total e¤ort in contest two depends upon the identity of the winner of the …rst contest, as seen from (23) and (24). Using, in addition, (28) and (29), we …nd that the total e¤ort with asymmetric win advantages is
where v i is given in equation (27) . This expression is complicated, but numerical simulations lead us to the conclusion that total e¤ort is increasing in the secondcontest prize M . Hence, an e¤ort-maximizing principal should set M = 1, as in the case of a symmetric win advantage. Again, the principal wants the contestants to compete initially so that the cost of e¤ort in contest two can be lowered. From (23) and (24), we see that the total e¤ort induced in contest two is larger when it is won by the player with the larger win advantage (the lower a). However, the instrument at the disposal of the principal -division of the prize mass -does not allow him to select the preferred candidate for this stage. 
Social welfare and e¤orts
Suppose, as in Epstein and Nitzan (2006) , that the principal is interested in maximizing a weighted average of the expected payo¤s of the players and their e¤orts in the contest: max
Here, w 2 [0; 1] is the weight placed on the pro…t component; w = 0 is the case of e¤ort maximization considered in previous sections. Assuming, for simplicity, that r = 1, and that the players have the same win advantage a, using Proposition 1, we can write
19 See, however, Franke, et al. (2013) , who allow the principal to bias the contest success function in order to induce the most e¤orts when contestants are heterogeneous. It is optimal to run a single contest, i.e., to have M = 0, and to ignore the win e¤ect, if enough weight is placed upon the contestants'payo¤ by the principal. For this to occur requires w 2 ( , and otherwise being below the single-contest payo¤.
Conclusions
We have analyzed a simple series of two Tullock contests in which the winner of the …rst contest gains an advantage over the losing player in terms of reduced cost of e¤ort in the second contest. For the player with the lower e¤ort cost, two factors raise his e¤ort in the second contest: the direct reduction in the cost of exerting e¤ort and the indirect (strategic) e¤ect stemming from his relative cost advantage compared to the rival. The loser of the …rst contest reduces e¤ort in the second contest relative to the more e¢ cient rival. In this setting, we have considered how 20 Note that 1 + a 2a 2 > 0 for a 2 (0; 1).
the division of a prize mass between the two contests will a¤ect the total amount of e¤ort, and the time path of e¤ort. In both the two-player and the many-player versions of the model, we demonstrated that an e¤ort-maximizing principal should move all of the prize mass to the second contest; so that the "prize" for winning the …rst contest is a lower cost of e¤ort in the continuation. It is also possible to in ‡uence the path of e¤ort over time by this division. In some applications, a principal may desire to have more e¤ort early on; the Tullock contest has been used to model innovation games, and here one might wish to give research teams an incentive to early e¤ort in order to bring forward the discovery time of a new product. Once the product or prototype is discovered the teams can then re…ne their ideas, with the winner having an extra advantage at the re…nement stage. Research councils will often want most e¤ort exerted once e¢ ciency gains have been made and hence invite applications for pilots before full-scale research projects. Our goal has been to shed light on an issue which is prevalent in a number of management, marketing, economics, and political-science applications. Our results can add to the understanding of, among other things, how sales-force compensation schemes should be designed to increase sales e¤ort incentives, and how R&D contests should be designed to optimize the time pro…le of e¤ort. The model that we have used is simple, but robust to a number of extensions. In modelling the win advantage, we have assumed that this is in the form of a reduction in the future cost of e¤ort (equivalently that the winner has a higher valuation of the second contest prize). It is also possible to consider a win advantage that e¤ects parameters in the contest success function directly, through the creation of a head start or a favorable bias to the winner. Hence the input for the winning player in the Tullock contest success function (1) can be modelled as ( + x i;2 ) r , where 0 is the head start of the winner and 1 a bias parameter. This has been considered by Clark and Nilssen (2018a) who show that awarding the prize late is optimal in the case of bias, but that e¤orts are often independent of the prize mass division in the case of a head start.
One shortcoming in our work is the fact that we only have a model for two contests. The Tullock contest is often intractable when one adds synergy, even with quite minor adjustments to the basic setup. The all-pay auction is more amenable to such applications, and we have solved a multiple-contest version of this model with win advantage in Clark and Nilssen (2017) ; however, in that paper we do not look at contest design. The current paper assumes also an exogenous win advantage, and as such the setting of this and its origin are not considered. The advantage is also assumed to be certain, and known by all players. Relaxing these assumptions remains a task for future work.
